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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
VIRGINIA YEARSLEY, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : PETITION FOR WRIT 
: OF CERTIORARI 
vs. : 
OFFICER DEAN JENSEN, ET AL, : Case No. 86880145CA 
Defendants/Respondents: 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the Trial Court erred in failing to allow the 
Plaintiff to amend her Complaint to include claims for false 
imprisonment and malicious prosecution which would have made her 
claim timely under a Notice of Claim requirement of Utah Code 
Annotated Section 63-30-13. 
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The case was appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals and on 
March 30, 1989, Judge Norman H. Jackson filed an opinion of the 
Court affirming the Trial Court's decision. The opinion was a 
two-to-one decision, with Judge Greenwood concurring and Judge 




This Petition for Writ of Certiorari is brought pursuant 
to Rule 42 of the Utah Supreme Court Rules. The hearing from 
which this case was appealed was held in the Second Judicial 
District Court of Weber County, State of Utah before the 
Honorable David E. Roth sitting without a jury. The matter .was 
appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah and was 
thereafter transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals and A 
decision was made on March 30, 1989. 
Prior to the expiration of the thirty (30) day period 
within in which to file this Petition, an Ex Parte Motion for ant 
Extension of Time was made and a corresponding Order was signed* 
by Chief Justice Gordon Hall of the Utah Supreme Court, 
extending the time for filing the Writ of Certiorari for an 
additional thirty (30) days or until May 26, 1989, 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to 
Rule 4 3 of the Supreme Court Rules, State of Utah, in that 
Appellant contends that the decision of the Court of Appeals in 
this case is in conflict with other decisions or this Court and 
in addition, it creates a precedent for denial of Motions to 
Amend pleadings prior to Trial to conform:: to the evidences and 
such a restrictive view is not supportable and would set an 
improper precedent for practitioners in this State and therefore, 
a Petition for Writ of Certiorari is proper. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES 
5 
1) Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-30-13, (1986) 
2) Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff originally brought this action against the 
Defendants who were police officers representing three (3) 
different jurisdictions, to-wit: the Cities of Washington 
Terrace, South Ogden and Riverdale, for tortious conduct involved 
in her detention and arrest on August 28 and 29, 1983. 
In a hearing on September 14, 1987 the Plaintiff's claims 
against the Defendant Cities were dismissed by stipulation and 
the Court further agreed to consider at a later hearing, 
Plaintiff's request to Amend the Complaint to include the claims 
for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution which would 
defeat Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as against the 
officers on the basis of a statute of limitations violation. 
At a subsequent hearing on November 2, 1987, the Motion 
to Amend the Complaint was denied and the Defendants were granted 
Summary Judgment against the Plaintiff on the basis that the 
claim against the Cities and employees, pursuant to Rule 63-3 0-13 
which had been filed on August 29, 1984 was not timely filed. An 
appeal was taken to the Utah Supreme Court which transfered the 
matter to the Utah Court of Appeals, who upheld the lower Court 
ruling in a two-to-one decision on March 30, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
(The following fact statement is taken from the pleadings 
in the case, including Plaintiff's Affidavit and Memorandum 
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supplied at the time of the Summaiy Judgment Hearing. There has 
been no evidentiary hearing in the case and therefore, citations 
will not be to an evidentiary transcript, but the facts are based 
upon the allegations contained in those various proceedings). 
In the late evening hours of August 28, 1983 at 
approximately 10:30 p.m., Plaintiff, along with other friends 
were returning to her home in Washington Terrace, Weber County, 
Utah, from a boating excursion at Pineview Reservoir, East of 
Ogden. 
At that time, Plaintiff was a passenger of a rnotorhome1! 
driven by her boyfriend, Jerry Wells. The motorhome was owned by 
him and registered to him. 
That upon entering Washington Terrace City, a Washington* 
Terrace police officer pulled behind the motorhome as it stopped 
and parked in front of the Plaintiff's home. Plaintiff exited 
the motorhome and entered her home. 
Shortly thereafter, the officers began to arrest both 
Jerry Wells and Charlie Schultz, for driving while intoxicated 
and public intoxication. The Washington Terrace officer 
apparently called for assistance from officers from, South Ogden 
City and Riverdale City. 
The named officers in the Complaint then entered the 
Plaintiff's home, without knocking and without any authorization 
and requested that she move the motorhome. After informing the 
officers that the motorhome did not belong to her, a verbal 
argument ensued, at which time the Plaintiff refused to move the 
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motorhome. The officers drug her from her home to the porch and 
onto the driveway area where she was physically beaten and 
abused. 
At this time, Plaintiff was not arrested, but was then 
transported by the officers to McKay Dee Hospital approximately 
ten (10) miles away. Plaintiff was not released from McKay Dee 
Hospital until 1:00 a.m. on the morning of August 29, 1983. 
Following her release, she was then handcuffed, placed into a 
patrol car and taken to the Weber County Jail in Ogden where she 
was booked at approximately 1:30 a.m. on a number of charges 
including resisting arrest, interfering with an officer and 
disturbing the peace. Plaintiff remained incarcerated in the 
Weber County Jail until she was able to arrange bail at 
approximately 8:00 a.m. on August 29, 1983. 
The officers then contacted the Washington Terrace City 
Attorney who caused Informations to be filed on Misdemeanor 
Counts for the above referenced charges. 
The Plaintiff initially plead not guilty and some two (2) 
months later, all charges, but one, was dismissed through a plea 
bargain. The only charge to which Plaintiff plead guilty was 
disorderly conduct and there was no agreement on the part of the 
Plaintiff that she would not take legal action against the City, 
the various police agencies or the officers involved. Nor was 
there any factual determination by the Court that the charge of 
Disorderly Conduct justified any of the officers7 action. 
The Plaintiff initially filed her Notice of Claim against 
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all the Cities and named officers in this case on August 29, 
1984. Plaintiff contended that none of the parties had 
specifically responded, either affirmatively or negatively, to 
the Notice of Claim and the lawsuit was initiated on November 27, 
1985 and the three (3) named officers were represented by 
counsel. 
Discovery ensued and Interrogatories were submitted which 
were answered by the Plaintiff and numerous settlement 
discussions were entertained, but none came to fruition for a 
period of almost two (2) years. At this time, Plaintiff filed a 
Notice of Readiness of Trial. No objection to the Trial was 
raised, nor were any Motions made following discovery. 
Approximately three (3) weeks before the Trial, the 
Defendants, for the first time, filed Motions for Summary 
Judgment claiming that the statute of limitations had been 
violated. The basis of the claim was that the focus of the 
lawsuit was on the actual assault by Plaintiff and Defendants 
which occurred at approximately 11:00 p.m. on August 28th and 
therefore, the Notice of Claim was one (1) day late. 
Plaintiff took the position at the initial bearing on 
September 14, 1987 that she considered the incident as one (1) 
continuous tort beginning in the late evening hours and 
continuing until the Plaintiff's release from jail at 8i00 on the 
morning of the 29th. 
Plaintiff further requested that she be allowed to amend 
her Complaint to conform to the. facts, including the offenses of 
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false imprisonment and malicious prosecution which clearly took 
place on August 29th and subsequent thereto. 
The Court took this matter under advisement and allowed 
the Plaintiff to prepare and Amended Complaint. Plaintiff then 
filed an Amended Complaint and at that time, the Judge after 
reviewing the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint refused to accept it, 
claiming that it changed the basis of the lawsuit and further 
found that the conduct, although beginning on August 2 8th and 
continued to August 2 9th was not of such continuous tortious 
nature that it could be brought into the suit and considered a 
single act. 
Therefore, the Court determined that the matters raised 
in the initial Complaint were completed and therefore, the claim 
was outside the statute. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE 
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN THAT THE MAJORITY 
FAILED TO ADDRESS THE KEY ISSUE RAISED IN THE 
APPEAL WHICH WAS THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO 
ALLOW THE AMENDMENT TO THE PLEADINGS WHICH WOULD 
HAVE BROUGHT THE ACTION WITHIN THE APPLICABLE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PERIOD 
This is a case in which a Plaintiff is being denied 
access to the Courts in a redress of grievance on the basis of a 
very strict view of both the construction of pleadings and the 
definition of tortious acts by the Trial Court Judge. 
It was unrefuted in this case in any of the prior 
hearings that police officers began a course of conduct in the 
late evening hours of August 28, 1983 which continued into the 
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early morning hours of August 29, 1983 which at variour times 
they physically assaulted the Plaintiff, detained her in a patrol 
car, a hospital and jail setting and caused her to be airested 
and confined and later, prosecuted her for alleged acts. 
There is also no question that if any acts in this 
panoply of tortious conduct took place on August 29, 1983, a 
Notice of Claim filed on August 29, 1984 would be timely and 
Defendants7 statute of limitations argument would be moot. 
The entire focus before the Trial Court in two (2) 
separate hearings some three (3) weeks prior to Trial was 
whether the specific allegations of Plaintiff's original 
Complaint which focused on the assaultive nature of the 
officers7 conduct clearly taking place on the 28th could extend 
to the 29th as a single tortious act, or whether the Plaintiff 
should simply be allowed amend the Complaint to allege the other 
specific acts which naturally flowed from the officers original 
conduct and which clearly took place on August 2 9th. 
The Court was asked to consider both propositionse The 
first proposition, that being that the conduct on the 29th was 
simply an extension or continuation of the conduct on the 28th 
has been addressed in at least two (2) other jurisdictions in the 
case of Baker v. Burbank, 705 P.2d 866 (1985) a California case 
and Shores v. Branch, 720 P. 2d 239 (1986) a Montana case which 
discussed the concept of continuous torts. 
The Plaintiff's position was that when viewed in its 
entirety, the conduct of the police officers was a continuous 
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tortious act which had its inception on August 28th and did not 
actually conclude until some months later at the time of the 
Trial of the Plaintiff for alleged criminal conduct arising out 
of the incident. 
The nature of the officers conduct in originally 
accosting the Plaintiff, taking her from her home, placing her 
in a police car, transporting her to a hospital and from there to 
the jail, booking her and causing criminal complaints to be filed 
and then prosecuting, all arose as a single tortious episode with 
different tortious being bid as part of the whole. 
The Trial Court gave no specific reason for not adopting 
that view, but simply denied such an approach. There is no 
question that if that view of the conduct is adopted, that the 
statute of limitations issue is moot. 
What is even more compelling however, is that Plaintiff 
requested to amend her Complaint to allege specific incidents of 
tortious conduct that happened on August 29th, particularly, the 
false imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims. 
This Court has continuously held that amendments to 
pleadings, even during the Trial of the case should be allowed in 
order to afford all parties an opportunity to be heard on the 
merits and secure an appropriate remedy. Such amendments should 
be allowed liberally unless they would do violence to the 
process or duly prejudice one party or another. (See Rule 15 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 
245 (1983 Utah)) 
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In this case, there was no prejudice to the Defencife) as 
they had been aware for some two (2) years prior to the Mot-on of 
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the arrest*of the 
Plaintiff and in fact, the record is void of any claim b^ the 
Defendants of surprise or prejudice that would have arisen had 
the Court granted the Motion. 
The Court simply, for some unknown reason, determined 
that this Plaintiff would not be allowed an opportunity to 
factually present this case and obtain a remedy. That is the 
real tragedy of the District Court's decision that was further 
compounded by the Appellate Court. 
The majority of the Appellate Court, in a one line 
affirmance simply indicated that the Notice of Claim was not 
timely filed, without addressing the two (2) issues which were 
raised. 
Judge Newey, in his dissent, specifically focuses on the 
issue of the amendment of pleadings and found that such an 
amendment should have been allowed and the case should have 
proceeded to Trial. 
The entire purpose of this Writ is for the Court to 
review the file in accordance with the issues that were raised on 
appeal at the Appellate Court and to adopt Judge Newey's 
dissenting view which this Plaintiff believes is the correct view 
of the law in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court erred in this case in failing to either 
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consider that under the totality of the circumstances that the 
conduct of the officers on August 29th was part of a continuous 
tortious act beginning on August 28th, or allowing the Plaintiff 
to specifically amend her Complaint to reflect specific incidents 
of conduct on the 2 9th, either of which would have rendered the 
statute of limitations argument moot. 
The majority of the Appellate Court further compounded 
the error by failing to address those two (2) issues. The 
dissenting opinion of Judge Newey addressed the issue and 
correctly resolved it based upon the current status of the law in 
this case and it is respectfully requested that his view be 
adopted by this Court in its review of the Appellate Court 
decision. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this rf May, 1989, 
%ffe^ 
Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing Petition For Writ of Certiorari to 
counsel for the Respondents, Joy L. Sanders and Andrew M. Morse, 
Attorneys at Law, 10 Exchange Place, P.O. Box 45000, Eleventh 
Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 and Dale J. Lambert, Attorney 
at Law, 17 5 South West Temple, Clark Learning Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84101, postage prepaid this<^fe^P^--^f"-"May, 1989. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Virginia Yearsley, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Officer Dean Jensen, Officer 
Steven Wallerstein, and 
Officer Steven Smith, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Before Judges Jackson, Greenwood, and Newey (Retired Juvenile Judge 
Sitting by Special Assignment) (On Rule 31 Hearing). 
The order and judgment of the trial court is affirmed because 
the notice of claim made against defendants, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann, § 63-30-13 (1986), was not timely filed. 
Dated this 30th day of March, 1989. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Norman H. J^ efkson, Judge 
Newey, Judge dissenting: 
I dissent because, in my view, the actions upon which 
plaintiff has sued continued from August 28th into August 29, 1983, 
on the false imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims. The 
notice of claim filed under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1986) should 
be liberally construed to include the issues plaintiff raised in her 
proposed amended complaint and was, therefore, timely. Based upon 
that notice of claim, the trial court abused its discretion in 
rejecting the proposed amended complaint. Consequently, summary 
judgment should not have been granted. 
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 
Case No. 880145-CA 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 4th day of April, 1989, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order of Affirmance was mailed to each 
of the following: 
John T. Came < j> U 
Attorney for Appellant 
2568 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, UT 84401 /V ^ > /£ 
i:ik. 
Joy L. Sanders 
Andrew M. Morse 
Attorneys for Respondents 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Dale J. Lambert 
Robert K. Hilder 
Attorneys for Respondents 
510 Clark Learning Bldg. 
175 South West Temple, Suite #510 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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OFFICER DEAN JENSEN, ET AL, 
Defendant/Respondent 
EXPARTE MOTION FOR 
EXTENSION OF TIME 
TO FILE PETITION 
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Case No. 
COMES NOW, the Appellant above named, by and through her 
attorney, John T. Caine, and hereby requests this Court for an 
ex parte extension of time for the filing of Appellants' Writ of 
Certiorari for thirty (30) days. 
That a two to one decision was rendered by the Utah Court 
of Appeals affirming the lower Court decision on March 29, 1989. 
This Plaintiff believes that the case should be heard by 
the Supreme Court, but counsel for Plaintiff has been involved in 
a Capitol Homicide trial during the majority of the month of 
April and has been unable to complete a Petition. That such a 
Petition can be completed in thirty (30) days and therefore, an 
extension is requested to complete the same. 
That no previous requests for extension have been made in 
this case. 
DATED this day of Apri 
Attorney for Appellanl 
2568 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 399-4191 
ORDER 
Based upon the above and foregoing Ex Parte Motion by 
counsel for the Appellant and with good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant has an additional 
thirty (3 0) days, or until ' in which to file 
her Writ. 
DATED th is / fl^ day o 
^SUPREME COURT JUD"GE~ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing Ex Parte Motion for Extension of Time to 
counsel for the Respondent, Joy L. Sanders and Andrew Mr Morse, 
Attorneys at Law, 10 Exchange Place, P.O. Box 45000, Eleventh 
Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 8414 5 and Dale J. Lambertf Attorney 
at Law, 175 South West Temple, Clark Learning Buildingf Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84101, postage prepaid thJus^Cy^day of April, 1989. 
